We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompasses most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model.
Introduction
Models of directed search combine frictions, which are seen as an important feature of labor markets, with a significant role for pricing, which is mostly absent in models of random search.
The main mechanism is that workers observe the offer of each firm before deciding where to look for employment and, as a result, they can direct their search towards jobs that they find more attractive. A common assumption in these models, known as the market utility property, is that a single firm's offer does not affect the workers' overall expected utility. This property facilitates equilibrium characterization because it allows firms to treat workers' expected utility parametrically; hence the moniker "competitive search" that is often given to this literature.
A natural question is what are the foundations of the market utility property? The underlying idea is that a single agent's actions do not affect aggregate outcomes in a market with a large number of participants and therefore any strategic interactions can be ignored. Ideally, of course, this is a property to be proved rather than assumed. The standard approach for doing so is to derive the equilibria of a finite economy, where strategic interactions are present and strategies and off-equilibrium payoffs are well-defined, in order to examine their limit as the number of agents becomes large. So far this analysis has been performed in very simple environments with risk-neutral agents, no informational or incentive problems beyond matching frictions, fixed productivity on the job and urn-ball matching (see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) for the case of homogeneous firms; see Peters (2000) for the case of heterogeneous firms).
However, the applied literature has moved on to questions that require more complicated environments in order to be dealt with in a satisfactory way. Examples of such environments include introducing risk-averse workers (Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) ), match-specific private information (Guerrieri (2008)), endogenous choice of the intensive margin (hours) of work (Faig and Jerez (2004) , Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) ) and moral hazard (Moen and Rozen (2007) ). All of these papers use some version of the market utility property even though it has not been explicitly micro-founded in their environments.
In addition, the empirical predictions of the urn-ball matching function perform poorly when confronted with data (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) ) and many authors have used more general matching functions which allow for a more flexible relation between the labor market tightness and the number of matches. In sum, the directed search literature has moved ahead of its foundations in terms of both the production and the matching technology. This paper's contribution is two-fold. First, we propose a unified framework with flexible production and matching specifications and show that it encompasses most of the existing directed search literature including all of the aforementioned papers. Second, we show that such a framework retains sufficient tractability to analyze the finite economy where firms' strategic interactions are present and workers' expected utility is not taken parametrically. This analysis provides insights into the equilibrium of the finite market and, more importantly, it allows us to extend the micro-foundations of the market utility property to a very general environment.
We consider a finite economy with heterogeneous firms, homogeneous workers and general matching and production technologies.
1 As in the earlier literature, we assume that frictions arise from workers' lack of coordination. The hiring process is formalized as a game where every firm announces the payoffs that it offers and each worker decides how much effort to spend on searching for each of the jobs after observing all the announcements. Lack of coordination is captured by restricting attention to equilibria where workers follow symmetric strategies. In such equilibria some firms receive too many workers (i.e. more workers search for this firm than it has available vacancies) while others receive too few.
In our first Theorem we prove that there exist equilibria in pure firm strategies if the production function satisfies a simple condition, essentially concavity, and the matching function has some weak regularity properties. We combine existence in pure firm strategies with convergence theorems for the subgame of workers' applications (Peters (1997) ) to show that the finite economy equilibria converge to the equilibria of the continuum economy with a market utility property as the number of agents grows (Theorem 4). Pure strategies allow us to side-step mixed strategy convergence which is much more involved and has only been performed in simple 1 See the conclusions for a discussion of models with heterogeneous workers.
environments with risk-neutral workers and fixed productivity on the job (Peters (2000) ).
Additionally, we provide characterization and efficiency results for the finite economy that are currently lacking. 2 Existence in pure strategies allows us to evaluate a firm's strategy against its competitors' pure strategies which significantly reduces the complexity of characterizing equilibria. We prove that, under an additional condition on the production function, the compensation that a firm offers to its workers is increasing in its productivity (Theorem 2). Natural as this result appears, the strategic interaction prevalent in finite economies means that it is not immediate; indeed we provide an example where it fails when our additional condition is not satisfied.
We also show that the pure strategy equilibrium is unique when firms are homogeneous (Theorem On a more technical level, we should add that the strategic interaction among the agents in a finite environment makes the equilibrium analysis non-trivial. Specifically, the action of a single firm affects the payoffs of all market participants, which means that we need to keep track of the full distribution of announcements when deriving the equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, it is not a priori obvious that equilibria in pure firm strategies exist. For instance, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007) show that equilibria in pure strategies need not exist in a related environment 2 An exception is Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) who characterize finite equilibria for the case where firms and workers are homogeneous. Montgomery (1991) examines a finite market but assumes that firms behave competitively, essentially using the market utility property.
where pricing and congestion interact non-trivially. 3 Finally, finite directed search models resemble classical oligopoly problems. The demand curve for a firm consists of the expected number of workers that want its job. It is smooth in its "price" (i.e., the wage) due to the matching frictions. Even when there are more workers than firms, the firms do not extract all rents because an individual firm has an incentive to raise the wage in order to increase its probability of hiring. We contribute to the original motivation for directed search models (Peters 1984 (Peters , 1991 by characterizing the smooth demand system (Lemma 1). This enables a deeper understanding of the interaction of competitive price setting and matching frictions in finite economies and provides the basis for the other results in this paper.
The General Model and Examples
We start with a description of the economic environment, strategies and equilibrium concept and then state our main existence theorem which is proved in Section 3. The model is presented in a sufficiently abstract way to encompass a number of environments. Section 2.2 elaborates on various applied examples in detail, illustrating how many of the production and matching specifications that have been used in the literature can be mapped into our setting.
The General Model
The economy is populated with a finite number of firms and workers, denoted by = {1, ..., } and = {1, ..., } respectively, where ≥ 2 and ≥ 2. For production to take place, a firm needs to hire a worker. All workers are ex ante identical and each of the (potentially heterogeneous) firms can hire at most one worker. The game starts with the hiring process.
Then production takes place and payoffs are realized. The split of the surplus between worker and firm is determined during the hiring process according to the posting game described below.
The payoff of being unmatched is normalized to zero for both firms and workers. Firms maximize their expected profits and workers maximize their expected utility.
The surplus generated when firm fills its vacancy and provides utility to its worker is denoted by ( ). 4 The firm's ex-post profits (i.e. conditional on a hire) are denoted by ( ) so that ( ) = ( ) + . Our first assumption presents the restrictions that we impose on the firms' profit functions. 5 Illustrations of some economic environments that fall within Assumption 1 are presented in the next subsection.
Assumption 1
We consider environments where for all ∈ :
iii. there are unique and such that ( ) = 0 and ( ) = max ≥0 ( ).
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The Pareto frontier between a worker and a firm is linear (strictly concave) when ( ) is linear (strictly concave). In the case of strict concavity, utility is imperfectly transferable between workers and firms. Note that it is possible for the profit function to be increasing in the worker's payoff at part of its domain, say when the worker has to exert costly effort (see example P6
in Section 2.2). It is easy to see that, under Assumption 1, no firm has an incentive to make an offer below or above and therefore the space of utilities that firms might offer to workers
The hiring process has three stages. First, each firm simultaneously makes a public announcement: It commits to the utility that it will provide to the worker that it hires. Second, workers observe the announcements of all firms and each worker simultaneously applies to one 4 In some environments, the worker's payoff within a match is stochastic. In that case, represents the worker's expected utility conditional on getting the job. See Section 2.2 for illustrations. 5 These conditions can be rewritten in terms of (⋅). It turns out to be more convenient to work with (⋅). 6 Workers' individual rationality means that ≥ 0 is a necessary condition for a hire to occur.
firm. Last, each firm goes through a recruitment process in which it hires at most one of its applicants, and remains idle if it does not receive any application. Recruitment is anonymous, i.e., each applicant has the same chance to get hired.
The strategy of worker specifies the probability with which he applies to each firm after observing some announcement v = ( 1 , 2 , ..., ) ∈ . Let (v) denote the probability that worker applies to firm after observing v. We focus our attention on equilibria where workers follow symmetric strategies: ( v) = (v) = (v) for all , ∈ . Such equilibria are intended to capture the frictions of labor markets. We denote the strategy of workers by the
When there is no possibility for confusion, we suppress the argument v to keep notation simple.
We now specify the recruitment process, i.e., the mapping from the application strategies to the probabilities of filling a vacancy (for firms) and finding a job (for workers). The probability that a firm fills its vacancy when each worker applies there with probability is denoted by ( ). The probability that a worker is hired by a firm where every other worker applies with probability is denoted by ( ). We allow for general functional forms for ( ) and ( ) that encompass a variety of specifications including the commonly-used urn-ball matching (e.g. in ii. ( ) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, convex and ( ) ∈ [0, 1].
iii. ( ) = ( ).
iv.
Furthermore, define ℎ( ) ≡ ′ ( ) and ( ) ≡ ′ ( ). Parts i and ii ensure that ( ) and ( ) are probabilities and they behave nicely. Part iii guarantees the consistency of the matching function in expectation terms: the probability that a firm fills its vacancy is equal to the probability that a worker is hired by that firm times the average number of applicants to that firm. This condition links the probability that a firm hires with the probability the a worker gets the job and it also implies that a firm that attracts no applicants cannot hire ( (0) = 0). Part iv adds some structure to the relation between and . Specifically, it implies that a firm's hiring probability is concave in its applicants' probability of getting the job. 7 This assumption is frequently used in the search literature (e.g. Shi (2009)) and it is satisfied in many common specifications for the meeting process, some of which we review below. In this paper, it is used to prove that workers' payoffs are quasi-concave (Lemma 3).
There are two reasons behind our choice of a general matching function: First, it strengthens our results by showing that they do not depend on the specifics of urn-ball matching. Second, and more important, this paper's aim is to provide micro-foundations for the applied work that A worker's expected utility from applying to firm is given by ( ) . Utility maximization leads to the following definition of the equilibrium in a subgame.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Subgame Equilibrium) A symmetric equilibrium in the subgame that follows announcements v is a vector
7 Let = −1 (ˆ ) be the probability with which workers apply to a firm so that they get the job with probabilitŷ ∈ [0, 1]. The firm's hiring probability is given by¯ (ˆ ) = −1 (ˆ )ˆ , according to part iii. Using the inverse function theorem yields¯
which is equivalent to convexity of 1/ ( ).
In words, for a worker to apply to firm ( > 0), he needs to receive a level of expected utility that is at least as high as what he can get at any other firm.
Each announcement v leads to a unique vector of application strategies if at least one firm offers strictly positive utility. That is, when workers follow symmetric strategies, the subgame equilibrium p(v) is unique given any v with > 0 for some ∈ (Peters (1984), Proposition 1). 8 When v = 0 the workers' strategy is arbitrary. From now on we assume that (0) = 1/ for all ∈ but our results hold for any specification of p(0). We define market utility to be the expected utility that workers obtain in the subgame and denote it by (v).
We say that firm is active when > 0 and it is inactive when = 0. In the former case the probability that the firm hires a worker is strictly positive; in the latter case it is zero. Let
denote the set of active firms for a given v and note that it is nonempty. The set of inactive firms is denoted by (v). Following announcement v we can without loss of generality reshuffle the firms' indexes so that (v) = {1, ..., } and
We now turn to the firms' problem in the first stage of the hiring process. Firm takes as given the announcements of the other firms, v − , and the response of workers in the subgame p(v).
The expected profits of firm are denoted by
where (v) solves (1). Profits are uniquely determined given v since each announcement leads to a unique set of application probabilities in the subgame.
We now define the equilibrium of this game. A directed search equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game among firms with payoffs Π (v). Formally:
and all ∈ where the workers' strategies are given by the symmetric subgame equilibrium.
We are ready to state our main result for the finite economy:
Theorem 1 A directed search equilibrium exists when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
The next sections provide examples, show how to prove this result and how to characterize such equilibria. Readers interested in the foundations for large economies can find those in Section 5.
Examples
This section illustrates that a number of production and matching environments that have been analyzed in the directed search literature are encompassed into our framework. We first look at the production side and Assumption 1 and then return to the matching side and Assumption 2.
Production:
The following environments have appeared in the directed search literature and they differ with respect to workers' preferences, the production technology and the informational structure within a match. (2000) and Camera and Selcuk (2008) for models where wages are (potentially) renegotiated after matching. 10 Notice that when workers are risk-averse, the optimal contract includes payments to workers who are not hired (Jacquet and Tan (2010)). Most of the literature, including this paper, ignores the possibility of such payments. One informal justification for this restriction on the contract space is the (unmodeled) existence of unqualified workers who are never hired but who would apply for jobs only to collect payments.
11 Profit ( ) is concave if ( ) is convex, which is equivalent with being concave in . Since buyer and corresponds to his marginal valuation for the seller's (in our setting, firm's) 12 Since − ( ( )) ( ) + ( ( )) = 0 defines ( ), we have
This is the case everywhere on [ , ] . To see this, note that ′ ( ( )) is equal to the wage that implements this utility, but only for − ≥ 0 the firm makes weakly positive profits, which defined the range of possible offers [ , ] . Matching: We provide several structural examples of matching functions that can be used in our framework. These examples differ in the elasticity of the hiring probability with respect to the number of firms in the economy and the elasticity of substitution between the expected number of applicants and the number of firms. Consider the case when all workers apply with probability to firm . M 1. Urn-ball. Workers send their application to firm with probability . Assume that if a firm receives at least one application, it hires one of the applicants. This results in a Binomial distribution where firm has tries ( is the number of workers) and each try is successful with probability (i.e. each worker applies to firm with probability ). The probability that a firm has at least one applicant is ( ) = 1−(1− ) . This specification has been used in much of the literature, e.g. in Peters (1991 Peters ( , 2000 , Montgomery (1991 M 2. Qualification shocks. Extend the previous example with a match-specific shock that renders an applicant unqualified with probability (this could also represent the probability that the application is lost in the mail, etc). In this case a firm has a qualified applicant with probability ( ) = 1 − (1 − (1 − ) ) , since the probability of a qualified application is (1 − ) rather than as in the previous example. This example is described in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) to deal with some of the perceived short-comings of the standard urn-ball specification.
M 3. Limited interview capacity. Consider example M 2 and assume that a worker needs to be interviewed for a job in order to find out whether he is qualified, but a firm has only a limited number of interview slots. If the firm can interview no more than¯ < applicants, then the probability of hiring of hiring is (
1− is the Binomial probability that applicants apply, and 1 − is the probability that at least one of them is qualified. The second sum is similar, but due to limited interview capacity only¯ of the applicants can be evaluated. Such a process is examined in Wolthoff (2009). our assumptions for all ∈ (0, 1) and resembles the popular CES matching function. We expect many other specifications to fit our framework as well.
Existence of Equilibrium
The following three subsections are devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. First, we examine the subgame that follows an arbitrary announcement by the firms and show that the workers' probability of applying to some firm is quasi-concave in that firm's announcement. Then, we
show that a firm's expected profits are quasi-concave in its announcement, . Finally, we prove existence by using a fixed point argument which is extended to deal with the discontinuity in profits that often arises in models with a finite number of agents.
Analysis of the Subgame
In this section we characterize the workers' response to an arbitrary announcement by the firms v, and we determine how that response changes when some changes.
Characterization of Subgame:
We characterize p(v) in two steps. First, we determine the set of active firms. Then we determine the exact probabilities with which workers visit the active firms.
Recalling that (v) = max ( (v)) , we rewrite equation (1) as
To determine whether firm is active or inactive, compare with (v). If > ( , v − ), then > 0. Equivalently, < ( , v − ) implies that = 0. Last, if the announcement of some firm is exactly on the boundary ( = ( , v − )) then that firm is inactive ( = 0); if it were active then ( ) < 1 which leads to ( ) < (v) contradicting subgame equilibrium.
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To summarize these results, note that the workers' market utility only depends on active firms:
The following condition determines whether a 13 In other words, the correspondence (v) is lower hemi-continuous in v.
firm is (in)active:
We now focus on the active firms. In equilibrium, the exact probability with which a worker applies to each of the firms in (v) is determined by the requirement that he is indifferent across them:
Equations (4) and (5) Equations (3), (4) and (5) fully describe the equilibrium of the subgame. As noted in Section 2.1, p(v) is uniquely defined when > 0 for some ∈ and we assume that (0) = 1/ .
Workers' reaction to a change in a firm's announcement: We now examine how the equilibrium of the subgame changes when the announcement of firm is perturbed from to some ′ . Let v denote the initial announcement and suppose that > 0 for some ∈ . The case of v = 0 is treated separately below. We will use the implicit function theorem on equations (4) and (5) but we first need to determine whether the set of active firms changes, i.e. whether (
is the same as ( , v − ).
Consider firm with ∈ ( , v − ) and note that (
′ is "close enough" to we have that ∈ ( ′ , v − ). Furthermore, given any ∕ = :
When ∈ ( , v − ) we have two cases to consider. First, if < (v) then firm attracts no applicants after a small enough perturbation, the market utility remains unchanged (
. Second, when = (v) then an increase in means that firm starts attracting applicants and the market utility increases:
. When = (v) and ′ < , the market utility is not affected and the set of active firms remains unchanged.
Essentially, (v) is constant in unless some firm is exactly on the boundary for being active. Proof. See above.
We now characterize how p changes in response to a change in . We will show that ( , v − ) is quasi-concave in . We first focus on announcements in Ω and then generalize our results to the full domain Ω ∪ Ψ .
14 Recall that = (v) implies = 0 and hence firm is inactive.
Consider an announcement ( , v − ) where ∈ Ω (v − ) and some perturbation v ′ = (
When ′ is close enough to the set of active firms does not change:
then firm is inactive both under v and under v ′ and therefore p is not affected by a small change in , i.e. ∂ /∂ = 0 ∀ . If > (v) , we shall apply the implicit function theorem around F(p,v) = 0. The Jacobian of F with respect to ( 1 , ..., ) is given by
denotes the change in the expected utility offered by firm due to an increase in . The rank of this matrix is : the expected utility of applying to firm decreases in and therefore ∕ = 0 for all ∈ (v). As a result we can apply the implicit function theorem to show that ∂ (v)/∂ exists locally around v and that the matrix of partial derivatives is defined by
The following lemma describes our result:
Lemma 2 (Workers' response to a perturbation in the announcements) When ∈ Ω (v − ) and ∈ (v) a change in leads to
where
Proof. See the appendix. This characterization result is key to our analysis. It describes the change in the workers' probability of applying for a particular job when the firm changes its announcement. It has a clear economic interpretation. First, the response is stronger if the probability of getting the job ( ) is higher. Clearly, a given increase in translates into a higher gain for an individual worker when the job is easier to get in the first place. The response is negatively related to the marginal benefit | (v)|. A large | (v)| means that an increase in the application probability at firm diminishes the workers' utility from applying to firm by a large amount. In that case a small increase of the application probabilities by workers is sufficient to equalize the expected utilities across all firms. Similarly, the strength of the response is negatively related to the marginal benefit | (v)| at some other firm . When firm improves its announcement, workers apply more to and less to other firms. If the expected utility of applying to other firms improves quickly, then workers shift only little additional application probability to firm before the expected utilities across firms is again equalized. Therefore, the response by workers is related in a tractable way to the change of expected utility of the current firm and its competitors. Note that the components of workers' response that relate to firm ∕ = arise because of the strategic interactions across firms.
We use Lemma 2 to prove is quasi-concave on the full domain of announcements. In particular when v − ∕ = 0 − the application probability ( , v − ) is equal to zero for
and it is strictly concave for ≥ˆ (v − ). When v − = 0 − the application probability is discontinuous at = 0 with (0, 0 − ) = 1/ and ( , 0 − ) = 1 for > 0.
Lemma 3
The application probability ( , v − ) is quasi-concave in for given v − .
Proof. See the appendix.
Analysis of firms' strategies
We now analyze how profits change when a firm's announcement is perturbed. The goal is to prove the quasi-concavity of expected profits.
Consider firm and fix the other firms' announcement v − . We first focus on ∈ Ω (v − ) and we describe how to extend our results to ∈ Ψ (v − ) below (the case of v − = 0 is treated separately). If <ˆ (v − ) then firm is inactive, its expected profits are zero and
then firm is active and the first derivative of its expected profits with respect to its own announcement is
The second derivative is
It is not hard to see that equation (8) Proof. See above.
It is worth remarking that this lemma is not sufficient to rule out mixed strategy equilibria.
The quasi-concavity of firm 's expected profits is shown when the other firms follow pure strategies. Under mixed strategies, the profits of firm from posting is given by the weighted sum of the expected profits that result from each realization of the other firms' announcement where the weights are equal to each realization's probability. Since the sum of quasi-concave functions is not necessarily quasi-concave, we cannot rule out that firm 's best response to mixed strategies is also a mixed strategy.
Finding a Fixed Point
The final step to prove the existence of a directed search equilibrium is to find a fixed point in firms' strategies. The strategy space, , is compact and the expected profit function is quasiconcave. However, as show above, profits are discontinuous at v = 0. However, when 0 ∈ we have to deal with the resulting discontinuity. To prove existence we use the concept of Better-Reply Security of Reny (1999) . In our environment Better-Reply Security means the following. Consider any v ∈ that is not an equilibrium announcement and any sequence v ℎ ∈ such that v ℎ → v as ℎ → ∞ with limit payoff vector ( We only have to check the condition for the case when all firms offer zero, i.e. at v = 0. For any sequence of v ℎ converging to zero there is some firm that in the limit has an application probability below the average, i.e. ≤ 1/ and its payoffs are Π ≤ (1/ ) (0). If firm offers˜ = , then all workers apply to firm as long as < / for all ∕ = . So for every there is a neighborhood around the strategy of the other firms such that firm hires with probability one. By the continuity of the ex post profit function, firm can ensure itself a payoff close to (0) for small enough. This is strictly higher than Π because the firm can now hire for sure and hence the game is Better-Reply Secure. As a result, an equilibrium exists by the fixed point Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999) .
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
In this section we characterize the equilibrium set. We show that more productive firms will in equilibrium offer higher utility to workers under an additional assumption on the production technology. Additionally, we provide an example where our assumption does not hold and the more productive firm offers lower utility. We then show that the directed search equilibrium is unique when firms are homogeneous.
We first need to rank firms by their productivity. We will use the following definition and only consider environments where the firms can be ranked accordingly.
Definition 3
We say that firm is more productive than firm if
If one of the inequalities is strict, we say that firm is strictly more productive than firm . If both (9) and (10) hold with equality, then we say that firms and are equally productive.
Equation (9) states that when workers receive zero utility the profits of firm are weakly higher than the profits of firm . Equation (10) Proving that more productive firms offer higher utility to prospective employees is straightforward in the context of a continuum economy. One need only establish the following simple single-crossing condition between the probability of hiring, , and the utility that is offered to workers, : to "gain" a unit increase in , a more productive firm is always willing to raise by a larger amount than a less productive firm. In a continuum economy, this argument is sufficient to show that more productive firms offer higher utility to workers.
However, this logic does not apply in a finite economy because a single firm's action affects market outcomes and, in particular, the probability of hiring when making a given offer. Consider two firms (say 1 and 2) that currently offer different levels of utility ( 1 and 2 ) and are both contemplating a deviation to someˆ . The hiring probability that firm 1 faces if it offersˆ is different from the one that firm 2 faces because the overall distribution of offers will be different: if firm 1 deviates toˆ then the distribution includesˆ and 2 but not 1 ; if firm 2 deviates, the distribution includesˆ and 1 but not 2 . Therefore the hiring probability when offeringˆ depends on which firm is making that offer. As a result, single-crossing in terms of preferences is not enough because the "technology" by which a firm can convert the utility that it offers into the probability of hiring differs for the different firms. Maybe the easiest way to see that our main result in Theorem 2 is non-trivial due to the strategic interactions is the observation that one can construct environments with equilibria that are not characterized by first order conditions where higher productivity firms indeed pay lower wages (see Example 1 below).
We prove our result for equilibria that are characterized by first order conditions, because our proof relies on a direct comparison of these conditions. However, it is not necessary for the equilibrium to be characterized by the first order conditions and we provide an additional condition which guarantees that this first order approach is valid. The reason why the first order conditions need not hold in equilibrium is that a firm's expected profits may contain kinks. To see this, consider a firm (say, firm 1) that offers 1 and is active and suppose that some other firm (say, firm 2) offers 2 and is on the boundary for being active. Think of how the expected profits of firm 1 are affected by a change in 1 : If firm 1 reduces its announcement the market utility will fall and firm 2 will become active, adding a competitor for workers' services; this makes the supply of workers more elastic with respect to the announcement. Formally, in (6) the strictly negative term 2 ( 1 , 2 ) = (0) 2 is additionally introduced when firm 1 reduces its announcement. 15 If firm 1 increases its offer the market utility will increase, firm 2 will remain inactive and the supply of workers will be less elastic with respect to 1 . This means that the additional term does not appear in (6) . This creates a kink in the expected profits of firm 1, and therefore its the optimal choice may not be characterized by a first order condition.
The following assumption is sufficient to rule out the scenario described above by guaranteeing that all firms are active. More precisely, it states that every firm is active in equilibrium, even 15 The term (0) is strictly negative: Since ( ) is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, we have (0) = lim ↘0 ′ ( ) ≤ 0. Moreover, the convexity of ( ) rules out that (0) = 0 as otherwise ( ) ≥ 0 for > 0, violating the assumption that ( ) is strictly decreasing. Finally, in the example 1 > 0 (as otherwise firm 2 could not be inactive, but would be active at any weakly positive announcement), and so for firm 2 to be on the brink of becoming active it has to be that 2 > 0.
when all of its competitors offer the maximum individually rational utility.
It is easy to show that Assumption 3 holds as long as the maximum utilities that firms are willing to offer are not too far apart, i.e. there exists parameter < 1 such that Assumption 3 holds whenever min > max . Note that we only rely on Assumption 3 for the characterization proof of Section 4 and this assumption is not necessary for our other results.
We now prove that if a low productivity firm's first order conditions hold and it offers higher utility than a high productivity firm then the high productivity firm's first order conditions are not satisfied. While our equilibrium definition focuses on pure strategies, note that it does not restrict identical firms to offer the same utility to workers. This is one implication of the following theorem which shows that in equilibrium a more productive firm necessarily offers higher utility to workers.
Theorem 2 If Assumption 3 holds, then in any directed search equilibrium > if firm is strictly more productive than firm and = if firm is equally productive to firm .
Proof. See Appendix.
We now provide an example where Assumption 3 does not hold and there is an equilibrium where a high productivity firm offers a lower wage than a low productivity firm. We construct it in the canonical setting of the directed literature with linear production as outlined in Example 1 in Section , which has been the focus e.g. in Moen (1997) , Montgomery (1991) and Peters (2000). Since Assumption 3 holds when all firms are identical, and since it is easy to show that with two firms and linear production the equilibrium is always characterized by first order conditions, we resort to an example which in the end features more than two firms and firm heterogeneity.
Example 1 To set up the example, consider first a simple environment with two risk-neutral workers and two identical firms who produce 1 when matched and zero otherwise. The profit of firm is given by ( ) = 1 − . It is straightforward to show that the unique directed search equilibrium has utility offers 1 = 2 = 1/2 and expected utility for workers of (1/2, 1/2) = 3/8.
Now choose > 0 and > such that at wage profile (ˆ 1 ,ˆ 2 ) = (1/2 + , 1/2 + ) both firms individually prefer to reduce their offers. Choose both and small enough such that the incentives to reduce the wage are small. These parameters exist due to the convexity of the firms best response function. If the firms offerˆ 1 andˆ 2 then workers obtain some expected utilityˆ .
Next, introduce a third firm with profit function 3 =ˆ − that offers wageˆ 3 =ˆ . In this extended environment none of the original firms has any longer an incentive to lower their utility offer since workers would start applying to the third firm (the function ( , − ) can be shown to be non-differentiable atv because firm 3 has a non-negligible impact). Therefore, in the extended environmentˆ 1 ,ˆ 2 andˆ 3 constitutes an equilibrium, and the original two firms pay different wages despite the fact that their profit functions are identical.
By standard upper-hemicontinuity arguments we can slightly improve the productivity of firm 1 and obtain an equilibrium arbitrarily close toˆ 1 ,ˆ 2 andˆ 3 . Sinceˆ 1 <ˆ 2 we end up with an equilibrium where the higher productivity firm posts a strictly lower utility. Note that the proof crucially relies on the non-differentiability of the profit function at the equilibrium offers.
Examples of this type can be constructed in any setting that fulfills our assumptions on production and matching. We can first look at the case where two firms have exactly identical and therefore announce the same value to the workers according to Theorem 2, then introduce a third firm with productivity slightly above the announcement of the original firms and let it offer its full productivity, then adjust the announcements of the other firms upward slightly to set the third firm exactly at the point of becoming active and therefore none of the original firms wants to reduce its offers due to the resulting discontinuity, 16 and finally since preferences are strict we can adjust the productivies of the original firms slightly to unequal levels.
Theorem 2 holds when firms are homogeneous and it can be used to prove that there is a unique equilibrium in such a case. In the only related result, Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) prove that there is only one equilibrium where all firms offer the same wage in an environment with linear production and urn-ball matching. However, they do not examine asymmetric strategies by the (identical) firms, except for the special 2-firm 2-worker case. Our previous theorem establishes that there cannot be equilibria in asymmetric strategies when firms are homogeneous and, therefore, the equilibrium in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) is unique. Our proof still includes some additional steps to show that the result holds for general matching functions and general production technologies.
Theorem 3 When all firms are equally productive, the directed search equilibrium is unique.
Competitive Search as a Limit
In this section we present the standard one-shot version of a directed search economy with a continuum of agents under the market utility property and show that it is the limit of the finite game as the number of agents becomes large. This setup encompasses the models described in Section 2.2. Our exposition is closely related to Peters (1997) .
Consider an economy with measure one of firms and measure of workers. The workers are homogeneous and firms are potentially heterogeneous with types distributed on Θ = [0, 1] according to probability measure . When a firm of type ∈ Θ fills its vacancy and pays to its worker it makes profits ( ), where satisfies Assumption 1 and¯ ≡ sup ∈Θ¯ < ∞.
The timing of the model is the same as in the finite case: firms post announcements, workers decide where to apply for a job, matching occurs and payoffs are realized. The workers' strategies result in an expected queue length which represents the ratio of the expected number of applications per firm at each announcement level and corresponds to in the finite case.
The probability that a firm facing queue length hires a worker is given by ( ) and the probability that a worker who applies to such a firm finds a job is ( ), where ( ) = ( )/ .
Additionally, is strictly increasing and concave, is strictly decreasing and convex and they are both twice continuously differentiable.
The queue length across different announcements is determined by the market utility property which is an indifference condition, similar to equation (1), stating that a worker receives at least the market utility when applying to a firm. An important additional element is that this relation holds both on and off the equilibrium path, i.e. it determines a firm's hiring probability from offering some that is not posted by anyone else:
If > then is s.t. ( ) = , otherwise = 0.
As in the finite case, an announcement that is too low ( ≤ ) receives no applicants ( = 0) and a firm is active only if > . Let ( , ) be the queue length defined by (11) . Each firm anticipates this relation between the queue length and its announcement, and solves the problem
Definition 4 (Competitive Search Equilibrium) A competitive search equilibrium comprises the workers' market utility * and a cumulative distribution of announcements * such that for
and
The left hand side of equation (13) gives the equilibrium measure of offers in ( , ℎ ]. The right hand side gives the proportion of firms that find it optimal to make an announcement in ( , ℎ ]. If every firm has a unique announcement, then (13) holds with equality. 17 Equation (14) ensures that the worker-firm ratio integrated across all firms actually adds up to the measure of workers in the economy. It ensures that the utility that the workers obtain indeed reflects their scarcity.
For some of the convergence results it is more useful to talk about a firm's rank in the distribution. We define a firm as being of rank ∈ [0, 1] if a fraction of other firms has a weakly lower type. We can back out the actual type of the firm that has rank as ( ) = sup{ ∈ | ([0, ]) ≤ }). Let Π * denote the expected profit of a firm of rank in the competitive equilibrium.
We will now explore the connection of this limit game to games of the finite economy that we analyzed in Section 3. Consider a finite economy with firms and = identical workers.
In what follows, we index the variables that refer to the finite economy by . We label firms in the finite economy by their rank in the productivity distribution, so that firm is of rank / . Furthermore, we assume that the rank remains unchanged as the economy grow in that it coincides with that of firm of type ( / ) in the limit economy. Therefore, by construction the distribution of types in the finite economy converges weakly to the type distribution in the limit economy. Theorem 1 proves that the finite economy has a pure strategy equilibrium. Let denote the distribution of announcements for that equilibrium, the market utility of the workers and Π , the expected profit of firm = .
In the finite game we have some trading probabilities given by ( ) and ( ) when workers apply with probability to a firm, where and fulfill Assumption 2. The matching probabilities change when we increase the number of workers , and to make this dependence obvious 17 In principle, a firm could earn maximum profits from several distinct announcements, which is why (13) has a weak inequality. To see that (13) (13) is 1 but the right hand side would have to add to more than 1, violating the requirement that is a probability measure. reflects the expected number of workers at this firm. We will consider matching functions and that can be approached as the limits of and as → ∞ keeping = . It is easy to see that any pair and that fulfills Assumption 2 (when is replaced by ) can be approached by some sequence of functions ( , ) and ( , ) that fulfill Assumption 2. Since Assumption 2 is quite general, this includes most matching functions that have been used in the literature. In particular, the limit matching functions of the examples in section 4 are included, which in particular rationalizes the following different limit matching technologies that have both different levels and elasticities:
Example M1 :
Example M2 :
Example M3 (for¯ = 2):
First Example M4 :
Second Example M4 :
We will show that an allocation that can be supported for the limit of finite games constitutes a competitive search equilibrium, and vice versa. The following result shows the payoffs of workers and firms converge for large to those in the limit economy, which implicitly means that the equilibrium matching probabilities converge. 
Proof. The analysis for the subgame against a convergent distribution → * of (possibly 18 It is more convenient to index these probability by . Of course, this is identical to indexing them by since = .
characterizes the payoffs for the firms that offer any of the wages in . Peters (1997, p. 256) lays out that his equivalence theorems extend directly to convergence of finite equilibria if the finite equilibria exist in pure posting strategies (because in this case the equilibrium can be represented as a step function ). Our Theorem 1 establishes such existence in pure posting strategies.
Conclusions
In this paper we consider finite directed search economies with heterogeneous firms, homogeneous workers and general production and matching structures. We characterize the response by workers to changes in the offers by firms and prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies. In addition to being interesting in its own right, this result is useful in a number of ways. Proving the convergence of finite equilibria to the continuum This follows immediately for ∈ {1, .., − 1}, and holds for = by symmetry which is cumbersome but straightforward to verify analytically. Since the cofactor Λ has a similar structure as the determinant | p F| only with row and column missing, we have Λ =
(v), and we obtain
Equation (6) follows then from simple algebraic manipulations.
Lemma 3.
Proof. Fix v − . We first considerˆ ∈ Ψ (v − ), i.e. points where the workers reaction is not differentiable. We have already established there is only a finite number of such points. At these points the concavity of ( , v − ) follows trivially because a decrease in the announcement by firm increases other firms' expected number of applicants, while an increase does not. That is, by continuity of (⋅), (⋅) and (⋅) equation (15) . We differentiate (15) with respect to to obtain the following:
where v is omitted for brevity. We now show that (16) is strictly negative. We split the term in the round bracket into three parts, 1 , 2 and 3 , and show that each is non-negative.
The first part is given by 1 = ( ) [∂ /∂ ] and it is strictly positive because ( ) and are strictly negative. Part 2 is given by
Rearranging the above and using (15) yields
The last term is positive so we only need to show that term in the square bracket is positive, which holds exactly when 1/ ( ) is convex. Proof. Under Assumption 3, (v) = and the announcement of every firm is characterized by its first order condition:
From now on we focus on firms 1 and 2 without loss of generality. Let firm 1 be strictly more productive than firm 2. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume 1 ≤ 2 (the proof for equal productivities and 1 < 2 is analogous). Under this assumption we will show that ∂Π 2 /∂ 2 = 0 and then ∂Π 1 /∂ 1 > 0, which contradicts profit maximization for firm 1 and proves that 1 > 2 is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
We proceed by assuming 1 ≤ 2 . To compare the first order conditions of firms 1 and 2 we can work with the following two sets of inequalities:
The first inequality of equations (18) and (19) is due to firm 1 being more productive and at least one of them has to hold strictly (according to Definition 3). The second inequality of equation (18) is due to the (weak) concavity of (⋅). The second inequality of equation (19) is due to the fact that ( ) is decreasing in in the relevant range.
Rearranging equation (17) yields
If the term multiplying ( ) is higher for firm 1 than for firm 2, then the first derivative of firm 
